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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Where the Action Is: An Analysis of Partisan Change in House of 
 
 Representatives Open Seat Elections, 2000-2014 
 
 
by 
 
 
Kyle Wallace, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2015 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Damon Cann 
Department: Political Science 
 
 
 Open seat House of Representatives elections are an area that has not received the 
same attention as seats with incumbents, despite open seats traditionally providing more 
interesting results.  This research examines partisan change in open seat House races 
from 2000-2014 in order to determine whether previous research is still applicable in 
light of changing behavior of open seats in the 2000s.  This research found that since 
2004 partisan change has occurred more often with incumbents being defeated and not 
due to open seats.  A logit model was used with partisan change as the dichotomous 
dependent variable, a unique approach to House elections.  The model found that 
candidate spending was the most significant variable in explaining partisan change, while 
other variables such as district competitiveness, candidate quality, and unemployment 
were also significant.  The model was then used to predict the 2014 House elections, 
correctly predicting roughly 75% of races.  Finally two case studies were examined 
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where the model failed to provide accurate predictions to determine improvements that 
could be made to future iterations of the model. 
(57 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
Where the Action Is: An Analysis of Partisan Change in House of 
 Representatives Open Seat Elections, 2000-2014 
 
Kyle Wallace 
 
 
The purpose of this research is to better understand what causes partisan change 
in House of Representatives open seat elections from 2000-2014.  Despite being the 
source of the majority of freshman entering the House and traditionally having a higher 
rate of partisan change, open seats receive less attention in the political science literature 
than seats involving incumbents.  The most comprehensive look at open seats came from 
Ronald Keith Gaddie and Charles S Bullock III in their 2000 book Elections to Open 
Seats in the U.S. House.  Since 2000, very little research has been done to update the 
ever-changing environment surrounding House seats. 
In addition to examining a new set of data, a unique approach was taken by using 
the dichotomous variable of partisan change as the dependent variable.  The focus on 
partisan change rather than vote share is also something rarely done in the literature.  
Vote-share models and public polling are the dominant methods for predicting House 
seats.  A logit model that estimates the predicted probability of partisan change occurring 
can be a useful tool for scholars and for campaigns as it provides unique insights into 
what factors will make a seat competitive.  A benefit of this model is that it can be used 
for long-term forecasting for parties to determine where their efforts may be best served. 
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 The volatile nature of House of Representatives elections in the 21st century has 
resulted in incredible partisan seat swings.  Partisan change has both theoretical and 
practical importance in the study of congressional elections.  Seat swings determine 
which party controls the House of Representatives, and by extension the policy agenda 
for the next two years.  Partisan change can signal which party is being held responsible 
for past failures, which policy platform the electorate accepts, or suggest a demographic 
or partisan shift within a congressional district.  Past research has shown that partisan seat 
swings occur at a higher rate in open seat races.  The primary focus of this research will 
seek to answer the question: what factors are responsible for open seat partisan change in 
the 2000 through 2012 House elections? 
 The answer to this question will ultimately be determined through a logit model 
using partisan change as the dependent variable.  This unique modeling design will 
bolster our understanding of what factors ultimately make open seats more likely to 
experience partisan change.  To fully understand the implications of the model, this 
research will also explore the context in which the model exists by examining the trends 
in open seat House elections, and how such trends differ or conform to previous research 
and trends.  An ancillary portion of this research will explore strategic retirement to 
determine whether, and how, this phenomena may be accounted for in an analysis of 
open seats. 
The century was ushered in by an extraordinary presidential election and a 
forgettable House election.  From 1934 to 1996, only once had the president’s party 
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gained seats in the House during a midterm election (1934), yet in the span of three 
elections it occurred twice (1998 and 2002).  In 2004, unusual redistricting in Texas 
overshadowed a mellow Republican gain.  2006 and 2008 were good years for Democrats 
as they took control of the House.  2006 provided the Democrats with their largest seat 
gain since 1974, while 2008 appeared to provide a clear mandate for the Democratic 
Party through their control of Congress and the Presidency.  This dominance was short 
lived as Republicans gained 63 seats (their largest gain since 1938) and assumed control 
of the House in the 2010 midterm election.  Finally in 2012 the Democrats were able to 
pick up a few seats while retaining the presidency. 
To explore partisan change in House open seat elections, this research will first 
review the existing literature on open seat elections.  It will then explore the role and 
features of open seats in the 1990s compared to the 2000s and the role of strategic 
retirement on partisan change in open seats.  The next section will lay out the 
methodology used to construct the model and present the analysis of this research.  The 
developed model will then be used to predict the outcomes of the 2014 open seats and 
provides a discussion on the effectiveness of this model as a predictive tool.  Case studies 
of two 2014 open seats that were incorrectly predicted by the model will be briefly 
explored to determine possible shortcomings of the model in prediction. This research 
will conclude with a summary of the major findings and suggest further research that can 
build upon our knowledge of open seat elections.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 Despite the continuous evolution of congressional elections, one thing has 
remained constant: the incumbency advantage.  Incumbents continually get re-elected at 
rates well over 90%.  David Mayhew’s seminal piece “Congressional Elections: The 
Case of the Vanishing Marginals” articulated the trend of a declining number of 
competitive districts.  Subsequent research has discovered that incumbents hold strong 
advantages over challengers when it comes to name recognition, fundraising, and 
institutional privileges, such as franking (Mayhew 1974, Gelman and King 1990).  Due to 
the fact that incumbents rarely lose, quality challengers generally do not run against 
incumbents, which adds to the incumbency advantage (Alford and Hibbing 1981).   
Gaddie and Bullock cleverly assesses the current situation of congressional 
election research as “concentrated on a place in which little has happened, is happening, 
and may never happen” (Gaddie and Bullock 2000) with regards to all the attention 
placed on the incumbency advantage.  On the other hand, seats that lack an incumbent are 
generally more competitive, yet less research is devoted to understanding these races.  
This may be due to the fact that open seats usually only make up a small number of seats 
each election cycle.  Open seats are where the action is. 
 
Why Open Seats? 
 
 
 35% of House open seats between 1982 and 1994 experienced partisan change 
(Gaddie and Bullock 2000, Gaddie 1997).  Even if the extraordinary 1994 election is 
omitted, the partisan change rate remains above 30%.  This is a far higher partisan change 
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rate than those that include incumbents.  History has shown that open seats usually 
receive more attention from political parties, greater coverage in the media, and usually 
are more competitive.  Simply put, open seats have historically been more interesting and 
provided more action than races involving incumbents. 
 The most comprehensive look at open seats in the 1980s and 1990s was Elections 
to Open Seats in the U.S. House (Gaddie and Bullock 2000), which presented a vote-
share model with the following predictor variables: candidate experience, campaign 
spending, minority population percent, whether it was a southern state, and presidential 
coattails.  All variables but “south” were statistically significant.  Gaddie and Bullock 
found that open seat candidates who held the experience and spending advantage won 
their election at a rate close to that of an incumbent.  Open seats were usually more 
competitive, but a surprising number were outside of the “marginal” range. 
 The Gaddie and Bullock open seat model reinforced common findings of election 
research.  Winners of open seats usually held a spending and/or experience advantage 
over their opponents.  Districts with high minority populations resulted in a lower 
Republican vote share.  Presidential coattails were statistically significant but not decisive 
in many races.  The research appeared to support the theory that district and candidate 
factors were more important than a national tide.  One notable omission in their model 
was the failure to include an economic control variable. 
 The literature specifically on open seats has not been as developed as many other 
types of elections.  The studies specifically regarding open seats are primarily based on 
data from decades ago.  What held true in 1982 may not in 2014.  Congressional elections 
theory must continually be tested using current data otherwise we may miss important 
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evolutions in the nature of congressional elections.  With open seat research being both 
limited and dated, this research seeks to help fill that gap.   
 
Why Partisan Change? 
 
 
 The control of Congress is what keeps the public and media fixed on 
congressional elections.  We care about who wins.  The party that controls the House of 
Representatives sets the agenda for the next two years and is able to legislate policy 
priorities.  No other aspect of House elections is of more practical importance than 
partisan change.  In order for control of the House to change, partisan change must occur 
either through defeating incumbents or through picking up open seats.  With the goal of 
this research being to understand partisan change, it makes sense to examine where most 
partisan change occurs.  Previous research has pointed to open seats being the best 
vehicle for partisan change.   
 Most congressional election models use vote share (whether Republican or 
Democrat) as the dependent variable.  This research will examine open seat elections 
using a dichotomous dependent variable to determine whether the seat experienced 
partisan change.  This will allow coefficients to be expressed as the change in probability 
of partisan change occurring.  Examining congressional elections through this lens may 
be more representative of the reality of elections because there is always some element of 
chance or randomness which is captured better through probability of partisan change 
than a linear estimate of vote share.  Whether a candidate gets 53% or 57% of the vote 
may be interesting, but determining the probability of a seat experiencing partisan change 
is, in the end, what actually matters in an election. 
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Factors in Open Seat Elections 
 
 
Open seats typically attract higher quality candidates because quality candidates 
are usually not willing to risk their political future by trying to defeat an incumbent who 
has strong advantages (Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997, Newman and Ostrom 2002).  
Challengers to incumbents are also unlikely to be able to compete financially with 
incumbents (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006).  Donors want to make sure 
that the money they spend on elections will actually count.  Spending on those already in 
office is a safer bet than hoping that a challenger can overcome the electoral 
disadvantage.  When challengers are able to raise large amounts of money it signals that 
they are a serious threat and have had greater success in the general election (Gaddie and 
Bullock 2000). 
An important consideration regarding campaign funding is whether challenger 
spending is more important (or impactful) than incumbent spending.  The traditional 
theory, best articulated by Jacobson (1985, 1990), is that challenger spending has a larger 
impact on vote share than incumbent spending.  The theoretical justification for this is 
that incumbents are relatively well-known already, where challengers are not.  
Challengers need more funding to get their name and message out to the public to 
overcome the incumbent’s name recognition.  Gerber (1998) used an instrumental 
variable two stage regression approach to show that incumbent and challenger spending 
had relatively the same effect on vote share.  Most studies on campaign spending’s effect 
on electoral outcomes do not include open seats.  There are theoretical reasons as to why 
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spending by both the challenger and incumbent party should not be very different, 
supporting Gerber’s argument. 
 Most election studies, both presidential and congressional, take into account the 
performance of the economy.  During times of poor economic performance the 
President’s party is usually punished, but during times of strong economic performance 
the President’s party is not always rewarded because other issues take precedence over 
the economy (Owens and Olson 1980, Bloom and Price 1975).  This asymmetrical 
relationship suggests a possible contradictory public mindset that the government is to 
blame when things are going poorly, but the government does not create a strong 
economy.  But who does the public actually hold accountable for economic performance?  
Congress, the President, or both?  Norpoth (2001) examined whether divided government 
affected who was held responsible for the economy and found that the public held the 
President’s party responsible, even if the opposition party controlled Congress.   
Godbout and Belanger (2007) found that political sophistication plays a large role 
as to whether voters based their vote on their own personal economic circumstances or 
the state of the national economy.  Both high and low sophisticates were less likely to 
vote based on the “pocketbook theory,” while middle sophisticates were the most likely 
to use the “pocketbook theory.”  When intervening variables are properly controlled for, 
economic fluctuations do appear to be significant in elections and are included in most 
forecasting models (Grier and McGarrity 2002, Gaddie 1997). 
 It is unclear as to what role national factors such as the political mood or 
economic fluctuations play in an open seat race.  On one hand, open seat races may be 
insulated from economic fluctuations because neither candidate can be held directly 
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responsible as a member of Congress.  However, open seats could also be more sensitive 
to economic fluctuations or a strong partisan tide.  Even if national forces do have a 
significant effect on open seat races, it may not change the partisan outcome in most 
races.  For example, presidential coattails (evidence of a national political trend) were 
only found to be decisive in 13% of all open seat races between 1972 and 1992 
(Flemming 1995).  This suggests that candidate and district-specific factors are more 
important in open seat races, but strong national factors can sway a close election.  
Petersen (2010) found that national factors may decide open seat or special election races 
if the race is close and there is a dramatic shift in the national mood towards a political 
party.  While this finding may point to how national and local factors intertwine, it is far 
from conclusive. 
 The “presidential pulse” is an important historical factor in congressional 
elections.  In presidential election years, the winning candidate’s party captures some of 
that momentum in congressional elections.  This pulse is non-existent in midterm 
elections which usually see the President’s party lose seats in Congress.  Mondak (1994) 
found that presidential coattails are more effective in open seats, though this has been 
challenged by additional studies (Flemming 1995).  Regardless of the degree of 
influence, the presidential pulse has been shown to be influential in state and 
congressional elections (Born 1984, Erikson 1972, Campbell 1986). 
 This discussion has established why open seats are interesting, why partisan 
change is of practical importance, and the established factors that are important in 
determining the outcome of elections.  Moving forward, the next section will explore the 
context in which the open seat partisan change model exists.  A model independent of 
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context is useless.  Some of Gaddie and Bullock’s fascinating insights into open seat 
trends in the 1980s and 1990s will be compared with data from the 2000s in order to 
establish whether open seats are currently operating within the same paradigm.  After the 
discussion of open seat trends, an analysis of strategic retirement’s effects on open seats 
follows.  
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THE STATE OF OPEN SEATS 
 
 
Historically, open seat elections are the pathway for most incoming freshman to 
the House of Representatives.  From 1982 through 1994, 70% of incoming freshman did 
so through open seats (Gaddie and Bullock 2000).  Understanding the ways in which 
these freshman won their election to enter the House can provide valuable insights into 
what has been termed as “strategic politicians.”  Between 1954 and 2000, only once did 
more freshman enter the House through defeating an incumbent than through open seats 
(1964).  2010 witnessed more freshman entering the House through defeating 
incumbents.  In fact, 2006-2012 had high levels of incumbents being unseated.  Figure 1 
provides a breakdown of freshman entering the House from 2000-2012. 
 
 
Figure 1 How Freshman Enter the U.S. House of Representatives 
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 Not only are open seats the primary vehicle for new members of congress, open 
seats are usually more competitive and thus lead to higher rates of partisan change.  
Gaddie and Bullock found that 35.4% of open seats from 1982-1994.  Even when the 
extraordinary election of 1994 was omitted, the rate was 31%.  Due to open seats being 
more competitive, partisan swings in the U.S. House are usually the result of what occurs 
in open seats.  During the 2000s, these historical trends have not held true.  The 
percentage of open seats that experienced partisan change dropped to 25.6%, 
significantly lower than 35.4%.  In addition to open seats having a lower partisan change 
rate, from 2004-2012 over half of seats that switched parties were through incumbents 
being defeated, not open seats.  Figure 2 shows which percent of partisan change are 
occurring through open seats and through incumbents being defeated. 
 
 
Figure 2 Source of Partisan Change 
 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Open Seat 61.1 72.7 50 26.7 38.7 19.7 23.1
Incumbent Lose 38.9 27.3 50 73.3 61.3 80.3 76.9
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 In both sets of data above, the stark contrast between the 2004 and 2006 elections 
is insightful.  Prior to 2006, the electoral climate in the House elections was fairly mild.  
There were no strong national tides favoring one party with the exception of the 1994 
election.  Thus it shouldn’t be a surprise that few incumbents lost and that most partisan 
change occurred in open seats.   Have we entered a new era of congressional elections?  
If we are in the midst of a major electoral shift, perhaps it is one characterized by large 
pendulum swings and strong national tides.  This data may suggest that our understanding 
of open seat elections is in need of further development to cope with the current political 
climate. 
 Fewer open seats are experiencing partisan change.  So while most freshman are 
still entering Congress through open seats, the districts appear to be less competitive than 
prior to 2004.  A declining competitiveness in open seats may signal troubling long-term 
trends.  As Mayhew (1974) observed, “If fewer House members are winning elections 
narrowly, and if the proportion of ‘open’ seats per election is not rising, it ought to follow 
that congressional seat swings are declining in amplitude.”  The data shows that the 
number of open seats is fairly consistent, though the number of incumbents losing re-
election is rising which may offset less competitive open seats.   
 From 2000-2012, the average House election with an incumbent (omitting 
unopposed races) had an average outcome of 66.2%-31.8%.  In that same time period for 
open seats races the average outcome was 59.7%-37.5%.  Open seat races were more 
competitive than those featuring incumbents.  In only 13.5% of races involving 
incumbents (unopposed races omitted) from 2000-2012 was the winning vote share under 
55%.  For open seats in this time period, 35.9% of races had a winning vote share of 
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under 55%.  This is remarkably similar to what Gaddie and Bullock found from 1982-
1998, with a total of 36% of open seats falling in the “marginal” range of 55% vote share 
or less.  So while partisan change in open seats has decreased in the 21st century, the 
number of marginal seats appears to remain unchanged. Perhaps incumbent parties are 
more apt at winning close races than they were in the past. 
 Open seats have, overall, remained more competitive than seats involving 
incumbents.  Despite this competitiveness, fewer open seats are actually experiencing 
partisan change.  In the 21st century, defeating incumbents has surpassed open seats as the 
source of most partisan change in the U.S. House.  One explanation for this may be that 
redistricting has created so many safe districts that regardless if the seat is open.  That 
leaves the inherently competitive seats in battleground states as the places where partisan 
change occurs.  Perhaps competitive seats have just not come open during the 2000s? 
 Figure 3 shows the number of open seats in competitive districts (districts where 
the average presidential vote difference was within 5%) that experienced partisan change 
from 2000 to 2012.  In three elections (2000, 2006, 2008) we see high rates of partisan 
change in competitive districts.  However, in the other four elections we see less, or no, 
partisan change in these extremely competitive districts with open seats.  The overall 
number of competitive open seats were lower in 2000, 2010, and 2012. 
 In three of the elections, all open seat partisan change occurred in seats that were  
not competitive based on their presidential vote averages.  Even when the data is 
extended to include open seats where “competitive” is defined by the presidential vote 
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 Figure 3 Competitive Open Seats 2000-2012 
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triggered large partisan shifts in the House of Representatives in the 1980s-1990s.  It 
appears that defeating incumbents is necessary for large partisan shifts. 
 The roles of candidate experience and fundraising cannot be understated in open 
seats.  Gaddie and Bullock found that candidates who had the spending and experience 
advantage won at an 80% rate.  For the current data set, nearly 89% of open seat winners 
outspent their opponents.  92.5% of open seat winners either had the spending advantage, 
experience advantage, or both.  As Figure 4 shows, a remarkable 100% of open seat 
winners in 2006 had either the spending advantage or experience advantage.  It is clear 
that spending and experience, particularly spending, are extremely important in our 
modern political climate. 
Figure 4 Winning Percentage by Spending and Experience Advantage 
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While this is the case, the main source of partisan change shifted in the mid-2000s from 
open seats to defeating incumbents.  The partisan change percent in open seats has 
dropped from 35% in previous decades to 25%.  Open seats remain, in most elections, as 
the primary source of incoming freshman.  So while some aspects of open seats have 
changed in the 21st century, some still hold true. 
 Strategic Retirement.  The fact that incumbents are re-elected at an incredibly 
high rate has been used to discount the notion that congressman are held electorally 
accountable (Stone et al. 2010).  However, merely looking at the number of incumbents 
re-elected may not tell the whole story.  When candidates see the writing on the wall that 
they are likely to lose in the next election, they may decide to retire or seek a different 
political office instead of facing defeat (Stone et al. 2010).  This has been termed 
‘strategic retirement’ and may indicate that there is more electoral accountability than is 
readily apparent.  Conversely, when an incumbent is seen as being vulnerable, higher 
quality candidates emerge which may push incumbents into retirement or loss in the 
general election.  The failure to properly account for strategic retirement has been a 
criticism of growing incumbency advantage estimates.  Ansolabehere and Snyder (2004) 
found this criticism to be unfounded and that incumbency advantage is not overstated.  
They argue that while strategic retirement certainly occurs it is not widespread enough to 
substantively alter measures of incumbency advantage. 
Table 1 shows the percent of incumbents that lost in the general election.  The 
second row shows the number of open seats in each election, not including seats that are 
open due to redistricting.  The third row shows the percentage of seats that changed 
partisan hands that year either through an incumbent losing or through an open seat race. 
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Table 1 Incumbent Loss Percent and Number of Open Seats 
Year 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Inc. Lose 1.7% .8% 1.2% 5.5% 4.7% 13.5% 5.3% 
Open 
Seats w/o 
New 
34 33 30 33 35 41 40 
Open 
Seat+Inc. 
Lose PC 
4.14% 2.53% 2.3% 6.9% 7.13% 15.17% 5.98% 
 
 If strategic retirement is occurring, the real number of incumbent casualties may 
be closer to the percent on the third row.  From 2000-2004 including open seat losses at 
least doubles the percent of seats that saw partisan change.  However, from 2006-2012 it 
only provides a small boost to the partisan change percentage. 
 The circumstances surrounding how a seat becomes open may be a predictive 
factor to whether a seat will experience partisan change.  Determining whether strategic 
retirement is occurring when an incumbent retires or runs for another office is difficult.  
Strategic retirement is usually discussed when an incumbent is facing defeat (a negative 
type of strategic retirement).  However, there is the possibility of a positive strategic 
retirement.  This could be described as an incumbent handing their party successor their 
seat in a safe election so that in future competitive elections the new seat-holder will have 
the well-documented advantages of being an incumbent.  To parse out which retirements 
are strategic would require a careful analysis of each situation, but even then the retiring 
incumbent may not make it clear whether they are retiring for strategic reasons.  As the 
scope of this research is not to determine which retirements are strategic, both retirement 
and seeking higher office will be understood to be “possibly strategic.” 
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 Breaking down the open seats based on how they became open and comparing the 
partisan change percentage provides an insight into which seats are the most vulnerable.  
Table 2 provides this breakdown for open seats from 2000-2014. 
 
Table 2 Partisan Change Percent by Cause of Open Seat 
Cause of Open Seat  
2000-2014 
*New Seats Excluded 
Number of 
Cases 
Percent 
Experience 
Partisan 
Change 
Retirement 
(Possibly Strategic) 
162 25.3% 
Higher Office 
(Possibly Strategic) 
93 22.6% 
Resignation 
(Non-Strategic) 
10 20% 
Loss in Primary 
(Non-Strategic) 
26 19.2% 
Death 
(Non-Strategic) 
3 0% 
 
 While open seats due to retirement or seeking higher office do have a slightly 
higher percent that experience partisan change, it is not substantially different from non-
strategic categories.  The total of possibly strategic open seats by year is shown in Figure 
5.  The fluctuation of seats is within 15 seats from 2000-2014, though in years with 
strong partisan tides the total number of possibly strategic open seats is slightly higher. 
 If strategic retirement is widespread, years with higher numbers of possibly 
strategic open seats would seem to be correlated with overall higher rates of partisan 
change in those seats.  This would be indicative of unfavorable electoral conditions 
causing more members of the House to retire.  In Figure 6, the partisan change rate for  
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Figure 5 ‘Possibly Strategic’ Open Seats 
 
 
‘retired’ open seats is fairly stable with a slight bump in 2008 and 2010.  Both of these 
years saw major seat swings in favor of one party, thus it isn’t surprised that this trend is 
seen in open seat outcomes.  Despite this, it is not clear from this information that 
strategic retirement is occurring in many cases. 
  The national political tide also plays a role for incumbents considering 
retirement.  It would be expected that in years favorable for Republicans, Democrats 
would have a higher retirement rate and vice a versa.  Wolak (2007) found that the 
political climate was a significant factor in predicting retirements in congressional 
elections, especially House elections. 
Table 3 shows the number of Republican/Democrat retirements and the national 
political tide.  Republicans had higher retirement rates throughout the 2000s, regardless 
of whether the national political trend was in their favor.  2008 saw the largest number of 
Republican retirements and the smallest number of Democrat retirement in a banner year  
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Figure 6 Partisan Change Percent in ‘Possibly Strategic’ Open Seats 
 
 
for the Democrats.  To determine whether the retirements were strategic we need to know 
how many of the seats above ended up experiencing partisan change.  In strong 
Republican years, Democrats saw partisan change in retired seats at 70.6% and 25% 
while Republicans lost nearly no seats of their own (0% and 8%, respectively).  In strong 
Democrat years, Republicans saw 29.4% and 40.7% partisan change rates while 
Democrats lost no seats of their own.  Despite these partisan change rates that suggest 
strategic retirement, it is important to note that in 2010 and 2014, more Republicans 
actually retired than Democrats.  In the strong Democrat years of 2006 and 2008 many 
more Republicans retired than Democrats. 
 It is probable that strategic retirement has occurred in the 2000s, but how wide-
spread it truly is remains elusive.  Seats that come open through retirement or seeking 
higher office, both of which could possibly be strategic, did experience slightly higher 
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Table 3 Partisan Differences in Strategic Retirement 
 
 
rates of partisan change than those that came open through death, resignation, or an 
incumbent losing in the primary.  The difference, however, is not very large.  In strong 
Democratic years we see higher rates of retired Republican seats changing hands, and the 
same outcome when the roles are switched.  While this suggests that strategic retirement 
occurs, it does not show a causal link between retirement and an adverse electoral 
climate.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Retire 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Democrat 7 6 11 10 4 17 17 16 
Republican 23 15 17 17 27 19 16 25 
D PC 5 2 2 0 0 12 5 4 
R PC 4 5 3 5 11 0 1 2 
D PC % 71.4 33.3 18.2 0 0 70.6 29.4 25 
R PC % 17.4 33.3 17.6 29.4 40.7 0 6.25 8 
National 
Tide 
Tossup Weak 
R 
Weak 
R 
Strong 
D 
Strong 
D 
Strong 
R 
Weak 
D 
Strong 
R 
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METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
Model 
 
 
 A logit model will be used in this research to account for a dichotomous 
dependent variable.  The dependent variable is whether the open seat election resulted in 
a partisan seat change. The logit model will attempt to determine the effects that national 
and district-level variables have on the probability that a seat will experience partisan 
change.  The following variables will be included in the model to account for 
theoretically important factors in open seat races.  It is important to note that the variables 
included in this model are framed in a challenger/incumbent-party way.  The model will 
not distinguish between the Republican and Democrat parties as it is examining partisan 
change as a whole. 
Incumbent President Party.  A dummy variable to represent whether the 
incumbent party in the open seat race is the same as the President’s party.  The primary 
use of this variable will be in the interaction term with the unemployment and midterm 
variables. 
 Unemployment.  The model will include an unemployment variable to determine 
whether economic fluctuations impact open seat elections.  Specifically it will be 
recorded as the unemployment rate at the time of the last election minus the 
unemployment rate at the time of the “current” election.  The unemployment rates were 
obtained through the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  A positive value would mean that the 
unemployment rate decreased and thus would be expected to decrease the probability that  
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partisan change would occur if the incumbent party in an open seat is the same as the 
President’s party.  A negative value shows that unemployment has increased since the 
last election and thus may contribute a political environment where partisan chance may 
be more likely to occur.  Separate models will be run using the change in the national 
unemployment rate and the change in the state unemployment rate.  This will allow a 
comparison to determine whether voters are more concerned about their local economic 
conditions or those of the nation as a whole. 
 National Political Trend.  That national political trend variable is a measure of the 
national political mood.  The results from a generic congressional ballot will be used to 
calculate this variable.  The variable will be a dummy variable, 1 if the challenger’s party 
is favored in the national political mood and a 0 if not. 
 National political trends are inherently difficult to operationalize due to the fact 
that they change from election year to election year.  Not only do they change every 
election year, but they also change in magnitude.  Differentiating the extremely strong 
national tides that existed in 2006 and 2010 from the lesser tides in 2004 and 2012 
presents a problem.  One way that this has been accounted for is by including dummy 
variables for the elections years.  This is an approach that does not fit theoretically, but is 
a way of soaking up some of the variance of the model.  This approach does not work 
with a logit model that is intended for predictive purposes because future year effects are 
unknown.  In light of this challenge, the use of a dichotomous national political trend 
variable was used due to try and account for the theoretical importance of such a variable. 
 Incumbent Presidential Party/Unemployment Interaction Term.  The economic 
fluctuations interaction term is included to test the significance of retrospective voting.  If 
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voters do punish the President’s party for poor economic performance, or reward them in 
times of strong performance, it will be evident in this variable.  It may also be found that 
in open seat races, incumbent party candidates are insulated from economic blame due to 
no direct ties to economic policy.  The interaction term merely multiplies the dummy 
variable for incumbent President Party and the economic fluctuation variable, which tests 
for a difference in coefficients between the two groups. 
 Candidate Quality.  Candidate quality data was obtained through Dr. Gary 
Jacobson’s candidate quality data set for 2000-2012, and was determined through a 
thorough examination of candidate biographies for the 2014 election.  There are three 
possible values: -1, 0, 1. A -1 means that the incumbent party candidate has the 
experience advantage over the challenger.  A 0 is used when both candidates have the 
same experience.  A 1 is used when the challenger experience is greater than the 
incumbent party candidate’s experience.  A positive value would be expected to increase 
the probability of partisan change. 
 In/Out Party Spending.  These variables will be the log of candidate spending for 
both the challenger party (out party) and incumbent party (in party).  By including these 
variables, it will be possible to test for differences between the challenger and incumbent 
parties spending.  Data was obtained through the Center for Responsive Politics 
(opensecrets.org).  The 2014 data is current as of January 1st, 2015. 
 These variables were transformed to log form to normalize the distribution and 
provide a better fit for the model.  Campaign spending can vary widely based on the 
district and circumstances of the race.  It can be understood that, essentially, campaign 
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spending has diminishing returns.  A ten thousand donation to an expensive race has less 
practical value than that same donation amount to a “cheap” race. 
 An important discussion within the literature regarding campaign spending 
revolves around whether incumbent (in party in this research) should be treated as an 
endogenous variable.  Jacobson (1985, 1990) originally found that the effect of campaign 
spending was asymmetrical, benefiting challengers but not incumbents.  This puzzling 
finding led Green and Krasno (1990) to propose treating incumbent spending as an 
endogenous variable that accounted for the challenger’s vote percentage.  The reasoning 
for this was that incumbents would only need additional spending if they were threatened 
by a legitimate challenger.  They also suggested using the incumbent’s previous spending 
levels as an instrument for the incumbent’s current spending.  Jacobson rejected these as 
interfering with other variables in the model, though it did substantially increase the 
coefficient of incumbent spending. 
 It is not settled in the literature as to whether in party spending should be treated 
as an endogenous variable, especially in logit model as the Jacobson-Krasno/Green 
debate revolved around a traditional vote share model.  For the purposes of this research 
it will not be treated as an endogenous variable more in line with Jacobson’s approach. 
 An additional justification for this decision is that the fundamental differences 
between probability models and vote share models may make such a debate a moot point.  
In this logit model, in party spending is expected to have a negative sign which would 
reduce the predicted probability of partisan change occurring.   
 District Competitiveness.  The model must account for the political tendencies of 
the district.  The competitiveness of a district will play a role in determining whether a 
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challenger has a credible shot at creating partisan change.  An experienced, well-funded 
challenger who is running in favorable national conditions would still be expected to fail 
if the district continually votes for one party at a very high percentage.  The variable will 
be the incumbent party’s average presidential vote during the applicable redistricting 
period.  For example, if a district’s incumbent party is Republican in 2006, the variable 
will be average vote share for the 2004 and 2008 Republican candidates in that district.  
The higher this value is, the less likely partisan change would be expected to occur. 
 Midterm/Incumbent Presidential Party Interaction Term.  The surge and decline 
theory which states that the President’s party will lose seats in midterm elections is very 
well established in the literature.  The binary midterm variable will interact with the 
binary Incumbent Presidential Party variable and thus will only have a value if the 
incumbent party in an open seat is part of the President’s party.  If this variable is ‘1’ then 
it is expected to increase the probability that partisan change will occur. 
 
Analysis 
 
 
 Between 2000 and 2012 there were 284 cases of open seats in U.S. House 
elections.  Seats that were open due to being created as part of redistricting were then 
omitted from the data set.  Open seats that only had one major party candidate were also 
excluded from the data set.  The total number of observations in the final data set was 
243. 
 The logit model included the aforementioned variables and was run in STATA.  
One iteration of the model used the national unemployment rate and the second used the 
27 
 
state unemployment rate.  Table 4 presents the coefficients and z-values of regression 
results for the two models. 
 
Table 4 Open Seat Partisan Change Model 
VARIABLE NATIONAL STATE 
CONSTANT -24.21** -27.59** 
 (.001) (.000) 
MIDTERM 1.49 1.82 
 (.174) (.093) 
INC. PRESIDENTIAL PARTY 1.75** 1.86** 
 (.025) (.013) 
MIDTERM X INCUMBENT -1.15 -1.74 
 (.356) (.165) 
IN PARTY SPENDING -.49 -.45 
 (.074) (.100) 
OUT PARTY SPENDING 2.3** 2.5** 
 (.000) (.000) 
DISTRICT COMPETITION -.06** -.06** 
 (.017) (.014) 
CHALLENGER QUALITY 1.13** 1.08** 
 (.003) (.006) 
NATIONAL PARTISAN TIDE -.25 -.37 
 (.675) (.532) 
UNEMPLOYMENT .79** .86** 
 (.019) (.005) 
INCUM. X UNEMP. -1.01** -1.19** 
 (.011) (.002) 
CORRECTLY PREDICTED 87.65% 88.07% 
PSUEDO R² .5008 .5151 
LR CHI² 138.23 142.17 
P> LR CHI² .000 .000 
 
N=243    **P<.01  *P<.05 
Coefficients reported, z value in parentheses 
 
 
 Due to the similarities between the national and local models, Table 5 shows the 
changes to the predicted probabilities by variable for only the national model.  The 
differences between the two models are primarily in the presidential pulse variables and 
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the unemployment variables.  While this may suggest that state economic indicators have 
a greater role in open seat elections, it is difficult to tease out which model is more 
representative of reality.  Both models will be used for predictive purposes later in this 
research to see which fits the 2014 data best. 
 
Table 5  Changes to the Predicted Probability by Variable 
VARIABLE MIN-MAX -+1/2 -+SD/2   MARGINAL 
EFFECT 
MIDTERM .013 .0118 .0055 .0108 
INC. PRES. 
PARTY 
.0136 .0143 .0065 .0127 
MID X INC -.0064 -.0088 -.0035 -.0083 
IN PARTY 
SPENDING 
-.0526 -.0036 -.0028 -.0036 
OUT PARTY 
SPENDING 
.8313 .0204 .2131 .0167 
DISTRICT 
COMP. 
-.0705 -.0004 -.005 -.0004 
UNEMP. .0393 .0059 .0107 .0057 
CHALLENGER 
QUALITY 
.0281 .0086 .0052 .0082 
UNEMP. X INC. 
PRES. PARTY 
-.0955 -.0077 -.0103 -.0074 
 
 
Table Interpretation.  The ‘Min-Max’ column shows the change in predicted 
probability as x changes from its minimum to its maximum value.  The next column 
shows the changed in predicted probability as x changes from 1/2 unit below the base 
value to 1/2 unit above.  The third column shows the change in the predicted probability 
as x changes from 1/2 standard deviation below the base to 1/2 standard deviation above 
the base.  Finally, the marginal effect column provides the partial derivative of the 
predicted probability with respect to a given independent variable. 
29 
 
Table 6 provides the crosstab of the predicted result versus the actual result.  The 
model correctly predicted a majority of the cases.  It incorrectly predicted 15 cases in 
both the false positive and false negative categories. 
 
Table 6 Predicted Result vs. Actual Result 
 Prediction of  Partisan Change  
Actual Result  0 1 Total 
0 166 15 181 
1 15 47 62 
Total 181 62 243 
 
Both models fit the data very well, with over 90% of the area falling under the 
ROC curve in both models, as shown in Figure 7.  The state model was slightly better 
than the national model at fitting the data. 
 
 
Figure 7 ROC Curve 
 
 
 In/Out Party Spending.  The variables with the largest impact on the model were, 
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statistical significance at a .05 level, but decreased the probability of partisan change 
occurring with each unit change in spending.  Out party spending had the largest 
coefficients and potential for increasing the probability of partisan change with a 
significance level higher than .01. With such a large negative constant effect, at least one 
variable was going to need a large coefficient and with so few continuous variables and 
the established importance of money it is not surprising out party spending was it. 
 The model suggests that spending for the challenger is more important than the 
incumbent party’s candidate.  Spending is consistently identified in the literature as the 
most important variable to make a race competitive.  What this model does not determine 
is whether more money makes a candidate competitive or whether larger amounts of 
money are raised because the candidate is viewed as a strong challenger.  It may be a 
combination of both, with the district demographics and history also playing a role. 
 Challenger Quality.  Challengers who have an advantage in experience do have a 
significant impact on the probability that the open seat will experience partisan change.   
Conversely, if the incumbent party’s candidate has the experience the effect is a lower 
probability of partisan change occurring.  This result is consistent with both intuition and 
the literature. 
 District Competitiveness.  As expected, the more lopsided a district is the less 
likely partisan change does occur.  The coefficient appears to be small (-.06) but it does 
add up.  For example, a district with an average presidential vote of 55% for the 
incumbent party equals a change in the coefficient of -3.3 which is over double the 
coefficient of challenger quality and higher than a one unit change in the log of out-party 
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spending.  The lower the incumbent party’s presidential vote average is, the more likely 
partisan change will occur in an open seat. 
 Unemployment.  Both economic indicators (unemployment and 
employment/incumbent presidential party interaction) were significant at the .05 level.  
The state economic variables were slightly larger but very similar to the national 
variables.  Table 7 provides a breakdown of how the variables affect the predicted 
probability. 
 The economic variables show that when the incumbent party candidate is not a 
member of the President’s party and the unemployment rate has decreased, partisan 
change is more likely.  The interaction term shows that if the incumbent party candidate 
is a member of the President’s party and the economic indicators are positive then 
partisan change is less likely.  This supports the notion that the President’s party is 
rewarded for good economic performance and punished for poor performance. 
 
Table 7 Cumulative Effect of Economic Coefficients 
Cumulative 
Economic 
Coefficients 
Incumbent 
Party is 
President’s 
Party 
Incumbent 
Party is not 
President’s 
Party 
Unemployment 
Decreased by 
2% 
 
-.44 
 
 
1.58 
 
Unemployment 
Increased by 
2% 
 
.44 
 
-1.58 
 
 It is interesting that open seats where the incumbent party is not the president’s 
party are more affected by changes to the unemployment rate than when the incumbent 
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party is the president’s party.  This may suggest that economic changes will 
embolden/weaken the non-president party but help/hurt the president’s party to a lesser 
magnitude. 
 National Political Trend.  The national political trend dummy variable was 
expected to be significant and increase the chance of partisan change when the 
challenger’s party is favored at the national level.  This did not occur in the actual model.  
The negative sign was counter to what theory would expect, but the standard error was so 
large that the actual value could be positive.  In neither iteration was it even close to 
being statistically significant.  A possible explanation for this is that the effects of a 
political climate favorable to the challenger was incorporated into the economic 
indicators or in/out party spending.  Additionally, a dummy variable is unable to 
differentiate between a strong national tide and a weak national tide.  Thus in 2000 where 
the national partisan tide was virtually non-existent and 2008 where the tide was very 
strong were treated the same. 
 An iteration of the model was run with an alternative measure for the national 
political trend.  To attempt to account for the difference in magnitude of possible national 
political trend the range of the variable was from -2 to 2.  A -2 meant that the challenger 
was facing a strong unfavorable national climate and a -1 was a weak unfavorable 
climate.  The positive values meant a weak or strong political climate for the challenger.  
Even with this more refined measure, the variable remained insignificant and close to 0.   
 Strategic Retirement.  One purpose of this research was to examine whether 
strategic retirement could be used as a predictor variable for partisan change occurring in 
open seats.  There were two possible ways of measuring this within the context of this 
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research.  First, a retirement dummy variable could be added to the model with the 
expectation that if the value was ‘1’ then partisan change may be more likely.  The 
second method would be to parse the data out before running the model into one group 
where strategic retirement is a possibility and another group where it is not a possibility 
and examine the differences between the models.   
 A retirement variable was added to the model, but after several iterations of 
running the model it was clear that the retirement variable was statistically insignificant 
and caused discord among the other variables.  It is possible that strategic retirement 
occurs and in those cases may make partisan change more likely, but it may be too few 
observations to make a statistically significant effect.  Determining which retirements 
were strategic and which were not requires more knowledge of each individual situation 
than can be found in a macro-level election model. 
 When the second method was used none of the resulting models were not useful.  
Many of the variables were not statistically significant and the overall explanatory power 
was reduced.  In comparison to the models presented in this chapter it was clear that the 
presented models were much better based on the explanatory power, specification, and 
goodness-of-fit.  
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2014 PREDICTIONS 
 
 
 While the developed model fits the data well and provides interesting insights into 
open seat races, how successful is the open seat partisan change model as a predictive 
tool?  Due to the timing of this research, the model used data from the 2014 midterm 
elections to predict whether partisan change would occur in the open seat races.  Seats 
with one major party candidate were omitted from the predictions.  In addition, due to the 
unique electoral rules of House elections in Louisiana, any open seats in Louisiana were 
also excluded. 
 Table 8 lists the open seats in the 2014 midterm elections, the national and state 
model’s predictions for partisan change occurring, whether partisan change actually did 
occur, and the election results. 
 While the state model fit the historical data slightly better, the national model was 
slightly better for predictive purposes.  Each model performed strongly in different areas.  
The national model only correctly predicted 43% of races that were under 5% in vote 
difference between candidates.  Extending the measure to races that were under 10%, it 
performed even worse at correctly predicting 40% of seats.  It did correctly predict 66% 
of seats that actually experienced partisan change. 
 The ‘state’ model was more responsive to close open seat races, correctly 
predicting 57% of seats under 5%, and 50% for seats within a 10% vote difference.  In 
seats where partisan change actually occurred, the model predicted half of the seats 
correctly.  In some cases, the models predicted that a seat would be fairly competitive, 
but ultimately was incorrect.  A good example of this is Maine’s 2nd District where the  
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Table 8 2014 Predictions of the Open Seat Partisan Change Model 
DISTRICT NATIONAL STATE PARTISAN 
CHANGE 
WIN % LOSE % GAP 
AL-6 0.35 0.1 No 76.3 23.7 52.6 
AZ-7 0 0 No 75 14.8 60.2 
AR-2 87.48 87.81 No 51.9 43.6 8.3 
AR-4 53.22 52.55 No 53.7 42.6 11.1 
CA-11 0.04 0.01 No 66.9 33.1 33.8 
CA-31 98.75 99.74 Yes 51.4 48.6 2.8 
CA-33 11.36 5.54 No 58.6 41.4 17.2 
CA-45 0.27 0.85 No 65.2 34.8 30.4 
CO-4 0.07 0.15 No 64.8 29.2 35.6 
GA-1 0.02 0.01 No 61.2 38.8 22.4 
GA-10 0.03 0.01 No 66.5 33.5 33 
HI-1 9.44 6.51 No 51.9 48.1 3.8 
IA-1 7.94 7.2 Yes 51.2 48.8 2.4 
IA-3 96.38 95.1 No 52.9 42.3 10.6 
ME-2 44.89 36.74 Yes 47.1 41.8 5.3 
MA-6 72.11 69.39 No 54.6 40.9 13.7 
MI-4 1.16 1.14 No 56.5 39.1 17.4 
MI-8 23.19 27.96 No 54.8 41.9 12.9 
MI-11 28.26 37.48 No 56.1 40.8 15.3 
MI-12 0 0 No 65 31.3 33.7 
MN-6 2.37 1.88 No 56.3 38.4 17.9 
MT-1 37.79 44.16 No 55.5 40.4 15.1 
NJ-1 0.02 0.01 No 57.3 39.5 17.8 
NJ-3 75.14 92.78 No 54.5 43.8 10.7 
NJ-12 0.13 0.04 No 60.9 36.6 24.3 
NY-4 61.04 47.86 No 52.7 47.3 5.4 
NY-21 51.34 39.44 Yes 55.2 33.5 21.7 
NC-6 45.65 68.28 No 58.7 41.3 17.4 
NC-7 88.56 78.2 Yes 59.4 37.1 22.3 
NC-12 0.28 0.11 No 75.4 24.6 50.8 
OK-5 1.81 0.79 No 60.1 36.3 23.8 
PA-6 24.62 41.95 No 56.2 43.8 12.4 
PA-13 0.97 0.46 No 67.1 32.9 34.2 
TX-36 0 0 No 76 22 54 
UT-4 99.5 99.38 Yes 50 46.8 3.2 
VA-7 16.96 7.45 No 60.9 36.9 24 
VA-8 0 0 No 63 31.7 31.3 
VA-10 97.17 95.07 No 56.6 40.4 16.2 
WV-2 49.76 40.96 No 47.1 43.9 3.2 
WI-6 5.85 4.78 No 56.8 40.9 15.9 
TOTAL 
CORRECT 
77.5% 75%     
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models gave probabilities of 45% and 37% respectively.  Partisan change did end up 
occurring in that seat in a competitive race with a 5% vote difference.  So while the 
models were incorrect in the absolute sense, they were correct in pointing that the race 
would be close. 
 The Utah 4th District is also an interesting case.  Both models gave the probability 
of partisan change occurring at 99%.  This was largely due to the district competitiveness 
measure and the vast disparity in spending.  While the final vote difference was only 3%, 
the model had high confidence that partisan change would occur. 
 An interesting aspect of the 2014 midterm elections was that the spending 
advantage was not as prevalent as in previous years.  In only 82.5% of cases did the 
winning candidate outspend the losing candidate; the lowest since 2002.  In every case 
where the higher spending candidate was defeated, the candidate was a Democrat.  This 
speaks to the effect that a strong national political trend can have on an election.  Strong 
national factors can overshadow candidate shortcomings in experience or spending. 
 While the 77.5% correct prediction rate is less than optimal, this logit model 
could have practical uses.  It could be used to determine which open seats may be 
competitive in the upcoming election well before polling results are available.  The model 
does not take into account unique circumstances such as scandals or political gaffes, so in 
some cases it may predict a lower chance of partisan change than the reality of a race. 
 The model could also be used by political parties to determine the optimal way to 
distribute money to open seat races.  Using theoretical or expected values for some of the 
candidate variables, one could input different levels of spending to get an estimate on 
how each level of spending would affect the probability of partisan change occurring.  
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The logit model may not be as good a predictor of the actual outcome of a seat as vote-
share models, but it may be more useful for long-term planning. 
 A robust analysis of a House open seat would analyze polling results, traditional 
vote-share models, and a partisan change logit model.  Each provides unique insights into 
an open seat race.  For example, public polling and traditional vote-share models showed 
that the UT-4 race was going to be fairly close.  The final result in the race was fairly 
close, but was the outcome ever actually in question?  According to the open seat logit 
model: no.  This could suggest that too much funding and attention was given to a race 
that was going to experience partisan change regardless of spending levels.  On the flip 
side, if one merely looked at the open seat logit model one could come away with the 
false conclusion that Mia Love would win by a large percentage (and subsequently be 
surprised on Election Day).  The use of a range of models should provide a more nuanced 
and accurate analysis of an open seat race. 
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CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 The logit model fit the 2000-2012 data very well and correctly predicted 
outcomes in close to 90% of races.  Using the model’s results to predict 2014 seats had 
mixed results, but the performance was not as strong as hoped.  Examining the 
circumstances of races where incorrect predictions were made may provide an insight 
into how the model could be improved.  This chapter will examine two outliers: one 
where partisan change was incorrectly predicted to occur and one where partisan change 
was incorrectly not expected to occur.  The first case will be the Arkansas 2nd District and 
the second will be the Iowa 1st District. 
 
Arkansas 2nd 
 
 
 The Arkansas 2nd District is traditionally the most liberal district in Arkansas.  It 
is based around Little Rock, and is considered an urban district.  The incumbent party for 
the 2014 elections was the Republicans who captured the seat in the 2010 Republican 
surge.  Prior to this Republican victory, the seat had been held by a Democrat for several 
decades.  The seat was expected to lean Republican or be a toss-up at best. 
 The district competitiveness variable was 54.7, a good number for Republicans, 
but not solidly Republican.  The national partisan tide also favored Republicans.  
Unemployment in Arkansas had declined since 2012 by 1.2% and the national 
unemployment rate declined by 1.7%, which would suggest that the Democrat candidate 
would receive some benefit from these positive economic variables. 
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 The Republicans put forward French Hill, a former policy advisor to both George 
W. Bush and Mike Huckabee, as their candidate while Democrats put forward former 
Little Rock mayor Patrick Hays.  Hays held the candidate quality advantage over Hill 
because Hill had not held elected office.  Hill did have the spending advantage in the 
race, spending around 2 million while Hays spent 1.5 million. 
 According to both models, the seat was primed for partisan change, projecting an 
87% chance of partisan change occurring.  Hays experience and favorable economic 
conditions were enough to overcome the fairly small discrepancy in spending.  With 
spending being the dominant variable in the model, it was surprising that the models 
predicted partisan change in a seat where the challenger was outspent by the incumbent 
party candidate. 
 The final vote difference was 8%, which signifies that it was somewhat of a close 
race, but not nearly as close as the models would have suggested.  Prior to the election, 
polls showed a close race with a mild Hays lead.  So what went wrong? 
 One unique factor in this race was that in a midterm election where nationwide 
voter turnout was in the mid-30s, Arkansas actually saw higher levels of turnout. In some 
areas the turnout was over 50%.  This shows that the electorate in Arkansas was 
motivated to vote.  A strong turnout performance will almost always favor the nationally 
favored party.  In this case, that would be the Republican Party.  Due to the lack of 
statistical significance and a coefficient that is close to 0, the national political trend 
variable did not accurately reflect in the model what was present in the Arkansas 2nd 
District. 
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 It would seem that the importance the models placed on out-party spending and 
the lack of a significant national political trend effect caused the false positive prediction.  
A significant national political trend variable that could account for the strength of 
Republicans in 2014 would have provided a better prediction in this case. 
 
Iowa 1st District 
 
 
 The Iowa 1st District was described as a toss-up in most election prediction 
models.  The district itself is mostly urban and white, and has been represented by 
Democrat Bruce Braley since 2006.  The district voted Democrat in 2012 with 56% of the 
vote, a solid number for the incumbent party.  Unemployment in Iowa has decreased by 
.7% since 2012, which didn’t provide much of a boost for the incumbent party.  The 
district demographics would suggest that partisan change was unlikely to occur. 
 The candidate variables also painted a picture that would suggest that the 
Democrats would hold the district.  Long-time Iowa state legislator Pat Murphy, who was 
Speaker of the Iowa House for several years, was the Democratic candidate.  He brought 
in name recognition earned through several decades of being active in Iowa politics and 
had a strong political base.  On the Republican side, CEO Rod Blum, who had 
unsuccessfully ran for this seat in 2012, had held no elected office and campaigned on not 
being a career politician.  On the candidate quality measure, the challenger Blum scored a 
-1, which suggested that Murphy would hold the seat for Democrats.  Murphy also 
outspent Blum by over $300,000. 
 Given the improving economic conditions, the district’s left-leaning 
demographics, an inexperienced challenger, and the challenger being outspent, one would 
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not expect the race to be close.  The models predicted a 7-8% chance of partisan change 
occurring.  Early polls showed Murphy with an advantage over Blum, but by October that 
had deteriorated and the polls now showed Blum with a small lead.  When the dust had 
settled, Rod Blum emerged the victor by a narrow 2.4% margin.  How was the challenger 
able to overcome nearly all the factors that suggested he would lose? 
 The district was bombarded with Republican heavy-hitters such as Marco Rubio, 
Rand Paul, Rick Perry, and Chris Christie, which stirred up the district’s Republican 
base.  As in Arkansas, Iowa saw higher rates of voter turnout.  Based on state-wide 
statistics, registered Republicans turned out at over 65% while registered Democrats were 
around 55%.  Non-affiliated voters turned out at a 38% rate.  Consistent with the national 
political trend’s expected effect, Republicans showed more enthusiasm, which may have 
pushed this race into Republican hands. 
 It is difficult to pin the false negative prediction for this district on anything other 
than failing to account for the enthusiasm and strength of the Republican tide.  All other 
variables pointed to Pat Murphy having a favorable electoral climate.  Even with an 
adequate national political trend variable, it is conceivable that the models would have 
still produced a probability of partisan change under 50%.  It may have suggested a more 
competitive race, but the magnitude of the variable would have to be very large to change 
the prediction.  The Iowa 1st District shows that upsets happen.  National factors can 
overcome district or candidate shortcomings.  It is entirely possible that the 8% prediction 
of partisan change was correct.  The difference in the race was only 2%, which suggests 
that if the election happened 10 times, perhaps Rod Blum only does win one out of ten.  
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The voter turnout data suggests that Democrat apathy likely handed this seat to the 
Republicans.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This research opened with a discussion of the existing literature on House 
elections and partisan change.  A gap existed with open seat research, particularly one 
focusing primarily on partisan change.  The context in with the open seat partisan change 
model would be developed was then explored, comparing previous findings with current 
data.  A model was then developed based on the theoretically important variables found 
in the literature and adapted to a logit model.  The developed model was then used to 
predict the 2014 House open seat elections.  Finally two case studies were chosen based 
on the predictions to examine where the model falls short in its predictive ability. 
The primary research question asked what factors led to partisan change in open 
seats from 2000 through 2014.  The use of a dichotomous dependent variable for partisan 
change presented a unique look at the factors that produce open seat partisan change.  
The logit model performed strongly and fit the data well.  It was no surprise that 
challenger spending was the largest correlate of partisan change.  The other variables in 
the model helped produce the “climate” of the open seat, but it was ultimately the 
spending by both candidates that drastically affected the predicted probability of partisan 
change.  The statistical significance of changes in the unemployment rate, at both the 
national and state levels, and the attribution of economic outcomes to the President’s 
party provide evidence that economic indicators should be included in open seat models.  
While not all of the “presidential pulse” variables were individually significant, they did 
have joint significance. 
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The major disappointment of the developed logit model was the failure to 
adequately incorporate a national political trend variable.  As seen in the 2014 predictions 
and subsequent case studies, a working national political trend variable could greatly 
improve the accuracy and potential for the model.  This presents an excellent opportunity 
for future researchers to find a better measure for national political trend that would 
further improve on the applicability of this model. 
The interplay between national and district-specific variables was another focus of 
this research.  Are the outcomes of open seats affected by national political and economic 
factors or are district-specific and candidate variables more important?  The research 
supports the view that national factors do play a role in whether open seats experience 
partisan change, but more weight in the model was given to the district and candidate 
factors.  Generally the challenger would need to be well funded and be running in a 
favorable district to improve the probability of partisan change occurring.  National 
economic trends did have a statistically significant role as well.  The case studies make it 
clear that the national political trend is important, though the shortcomings of using a 
dummy variable were readily apparent.  To simply answer which is more important, it 
appears that district and candidate factors make an open seat competitive and are the 
primary correlates for partisan change, but the national political tide or economic factors 
can push some open seats on the margin into experiencing partisan change. 
This research contrasted our past understanding of open seats with the realities of 
the 21st century.  Open seats are no longer the primary source of partisan change, nor are 
they as likely to experience partisan change as in previous decades.  While the number of 
competitive open seats has remained remarkably stable since the 1980s, incumbent 
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parties are better at retaining open seats.  Gaddie and Bullock found that it was partisan 
change in open seats that determined changes in control of the House of Representatives.  
In the 21st century, large seat swings have been triggered through incumbents being 
defeated.  It is necessary to continually update our knowledge of House elections to 
account for the inevitable changes to the electoral climate.  Using assumptions based on 
dated research in current research could provide a misleading picture and ultimately be 
inaccurate. 
This research did not find strong evidence of widespread strategic retirement in 
U.S. House elections.  This is not to say it is not occurring, but rather that it may only 
affect a small number of open seats.  Incorporating strategic retirement variables into the 
open seat model only resulted in diluted results and less practical applicability.   
This research shows the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative analysis. The 
use of a mathematical model to explore the inner-workings of partisan change in open 
seats provided interesting findings with practical applicability.  But as the failure of a 
national political trend variable shows, a mathematical model will never be able fully 
capture the reality of a situation.  Our inability to properly quantify abstract variables 
such as a national political trend is a constant reminder of the limits of quantitative 
analysis.   
The rise of defeating incumbents as the main source of partisan change also 
presents a new avenue of congressional election research.  Has the incumbent advantage 
decreased in the late 2000s?  Are politicians placing too much confidence on their 
incumbency advantage, causing them to run in unfavorable climates which leads to 
46 
 
defeat?  Are open seats becoming less competitive?  Is this a consequence of partisan 
redistricting, natural sorting, or a polarized electorate? 
Despite all of the appeal, open seats remain an under-studied subject in political 
science.  Open seats still are the major source of incoming freshman to Congress.  They 
remain, on average, more competitive than seats with incumbents, and they do draw 
greater media attention and resources.  Understanding open seat elections provides us 
with fascinating insights into our electoral climate and shapes the future of open seat 
campaigns.  Open seats in the 21st century continue to be “where the action is.” 
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